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SUMMARY 
As a response to widespread criticism of auditors and the threat of government 
intervention in the profession’s affairs, the professional bodies in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand (and elsewhere) have established peer review schemes to 
monitor auditors’ performance. These schemes share a common rationale, objective and 
orientation but they differ in respect of the reviewee, reviewer, frequency of review visits, 
scope, confidentiality of review reports, public representation, and funding. 
Despite their differences, the schemes’ outcomes are very similar. In each case, the 
initial reviews found a high incidence of non-compliance with the profession’s standards, 
particularly in terms of audit planning, control and, especially, documentation. Later reviews 
have noted a marked improvement in the quality of audit work. Further, the monitoring 
process is eliminating auditors who persistently fail to comply with the profession’s standards. 
However, to restore public confidence in the profession, public representation in the review 
process is essential. 
Key words: Monitoring auditors’ performance, components of peer review, outcomes of 
peer review 
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INTRODUCTION 
The primary function of any profession is to offer service to the public in a specialised 
field of learning (e.g. O’Leary and Boland 1987; Benson 1980). However, because a 
profession’s services are specialised, users of those services are usually not able to judge their 
quality. As a consequence, market forces cannot be relied upon to ensure that users of the 
services are well served and some form of regulation is needed (RRlWP 1996). Given the 
specialised nature of a profession’s services, it is generally accepted that the profession itself- 
or the profession’s governing body-is best equipped to evaluate work performed by, and thus 
to regulate, its members. However, no profession has an unquestioned right to self-regulation. 
It must demonstrate it can regulate its members effectively or risk losing public confidence in 
its regulatory mechanisms-and risk losing the associated privileges and responsibilities 
(RRIWP 1996). As Mautz (1983) has noted: “in return for privileges, society demands 
superior performance, high ethical behaviour, and very rare failures. Absent society’s 
satisfaction and the profession’s privileges are endangered.” 
Flint (1988), referring to the auditing profession, focused on the importance of 
regulation to protect the public interest. He stated: “In a profession whose authority is 
dependent among other things on public confidence and whose social function requires a 
commitment to the public interest, a demonstrable concern, individually and collectively, . ..to 
control and maintain the highest quality of audit work, is a matter of basic principle. . ..It is 
necessary to demonstrate to the public that the auditing profession . ..controls and maintains 
the quality of its work”. To Flint (1980), the key issue is minimising the prospect of audit 
failure. After noting that this is what society expects, he asserts: “this is what the professional 
accountancy bodies as the regulatory authority have an obligation to pursue in the public 
interest”. 
Yet, reports of audit failures abound. In 1986, Connor, Chairman of Price Waterhouse in 
the United States (U.S.), stated that the auditing profession faced “a liability crisis and a 
credibility crisis” (reported by Russell 1986) and, given the $US180 million of damages 
awarded against the Big 8 international accountancy firms between 1980 and 1985, Connor’s 
claim seems well-founded. Reference to the news media reveals that the crises have not 
abated. In July 1994, audit firms in the U.S. alone faced liability claims of $US30 billion and 
settlements in 1994 included $US3 12 million by Deloitte and Touche in a case involving U.S. 
Federal regulators and $US12 million by Horwath & Horwath in relation to their audit of the 
Australian National Safety Council (Economist 1994). Similarly, in 1995 in the United 
Kingdom (U.K.), damages of 2.105 million were awarded against the former BDO Binder 
Hamlyn partnership for their negligent audit of Britannia Security Group’s 1989 financial 
statements (Accountancy 1996). Deficient audits clearly have adverse consequences for the 
auditors concerned but, additionally, reports of such audits serve to fuel criticism of auditors 
and undermine public confidence in the profession as a whole. 
Faced by widespread and often scathing criticism of auditors, and conscious of their 
responsibility to ensure that high quality audits are performed, accountancy bodies in many 
parts of the world have established mechanisms to monitor the performance of their members. 
This paper describes and compares the monitoring mechanisms, or peer review schemes, 
established in the U.S., U.K., Canada and New Zealand (N.Z.). More specifically, it defines 
peer review’, identifies its rationale, key objective and orientation, examines differences in the 
schemes established in the countries named above, and discusses their effectiveness. 
DEFINITION, OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE OF PEER REVIEW 
A definition of peer review, which captures the essence of the schemes established in the 
U.S., U.K., Canada and N.Z., is as follows: “A peer review is an assessment of an accounting 
firm’s (or practitioner’s) audit and/or other professional engagement procedures by one or 
more independent reviewers who come from within the accountancy profession. The 
reviewer(s) evaluate the adequacy of the accounting firm’s (or practitioner’s) quality control 
system” (adapted from Schiel 1991, 61). 
Like the definition, the motives underlying peer review are common to the schemes 
established by the various professional bodies. Three related motives may be distilled from the 
Introduction above, namely, (1) to ensure auditors meet their obligation to society to provide 
professional work of the highest quality; (2) to sustain public confidence in the profession by 
demonstrating a concern for maintaining high standards of professional work; (3) to avoid the 
adverse consequences of sub-standard work and loss of public confidence. A review of 
professional literature reveals a fourth motive-that of demonstrating to the public, and more 
particularly the government, that the professional body is discharging satisfactorily its self- 
regulatory responsibilities. The New Zealand Society of Accountants (NZSA 1989b) notes, 
for example: “The successful introduction of Practice Review will help to illustrate that self 
regulation is a better proposition than direct control from the government. The Society must 
initiate programmes such as Practice Review to maintain the confidence of the public and the 
government alike”. Similarly, in relation to peer review in- the U.S., Cook and Robinson 
(1979) state: “AICPA leadership hoped that a strong self-regulatory program . ..would satisfy 
the profession’s critics in Congress who were calling for direct government regulation.” 
Given the similarity of the rationale underlying peer review in the various countries, it is 
not surprising that the key objective is also similar. In each case, it is to monitor the 
performance of members of the profession to ensure they are complying with the profession’s 
auditing (and other relevant) standards (e.g. Wallace 199 I; Kemp 1993; ICAA 1994a). The 
schemes are also similar in their orientation: each of the professional bodies has emphasised 
that peer review is designed to be educational, not punitive. To reinforce the point, they have 
drawn attention to the distinction between the committee responsible for peer review and 
those responsible for investigations and discipline (e.g. ICAEW et al. 1992; NZSA 198913; 
ICAA 1994a). 
PEER REVIEW IN THE U.S., U.K., CANADA AND N.Z. 
Despite sharing a common rationale, objective and orientation, as is shown below, 
significant differences exist in the operation of peer review in the U.S., U.K., Canada and N.Z. 
United States 
Peer review in the U.S., in its present form, was introduced as a response to searing 
attacks on the auditing profession by the Moss and Metcalfe Committees and the spectre of 
government regulation of the profession had been raised. In 1977, the AICPA established a 
Division for CPA firms with two sections: a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Practice Section (SECPS) and a Private Companies Practice Section (PCPS). In order to 
qualify for membership of either section, all of the firm’s owners who are eligible for AICPA 
membership must be members, and a majority of the fnm’s owners must be AICPA members. 
Additionally, the firms must agree, inter alia, to subject their audit practices to peer review 
once every three years, to ensure their personnel meet minimum standards of continuing 
professional education, and to maintain minimum amounts of liability insurance (Wood and 
Sommer 1985). The AICPA also established an independent Public Oversight Board (POB) to 
oversee the activities of the SECPS. This Board oversees every peer review performed within 
the Section and reports to the SEC and the public on its evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
Section’s self-regulatory efforts (Cook and Robinson 1979). 
Until 1989, joining the AICPA’s Division of CPA firms was voluntary but, in that year, it 
became obligatory for all firms with AICPA members who engage in audits or other reporting 
assignments to join one of the sections of the Division of CPA firms or the newly established 
Quality Review Program.* In either case, the firm’s membership requirements and quality 
controls are subject to peer or quality review at least once every three years. ‘The key 
difference between the review programs is that, while peer review is intended to be 
“preventive” in nature (Wood and Sommer 1985) the thrust of quality review is “educational, 
rehabilitative and correctional” (Accountancy 1987). Thus, peer review is more exacting than 
quality review. 
All firms with AICPA members are required to have a quality control system for their 
accounting and auditing practices which complies with the AICPA’s Statement of Quality 
Control Stan&-h No.]: System of Quality ControIfor a CPA Firm. This Standard embodies 
nine elements covering independence, consultation (ensuring assistance is sought when 
necessary), assignment of personnel to engagements, supervision, hiring, professional 
development, advancement (ensuring all levels of responsibility are filled by competent staff 
members), acceptance and continuance with clients, and inspection (conducting periodic 
internal reviews of the firm’s quality controls). Peer and quality reviews focus on the adequacy 
of, and compliance with, the CPA firm’s quality controls for each of the nine elements. 
The reviews are conducted, at the reviewee’s option, by either a review team appointed 
by the SECPS or PCPS peer review committee or the quality review committee (as 
applicable), or by another CPA firm. Where the reviewee elects to be reviewed by another 
firm, the firms must be independent of each other and reciprocal reviews are prohibited. 
Further, where the reviewee is a member of the SECPS, a quality control review panel (of one 
to three members) is appointed by the SECPS review committee to oversee the review. 
The review team reviews the reviewee’s quality control documents, assesses whether the 
policies and procedures are appropriate to the size and nature of the firm and whether they are 
adequately documented and communicated to professional staff within the firm. The team also 
tests compliance with the documented policies and procedures by interviewing those 
responsible for the firm’s quality control functions, interviewing other staff members, 
reviewing personnel and administration files, and reviewing accounting and auditing 
engagement working papers and reports. 
At the conclusion of the review, the review team discusses its findings with appropriate 
people in the firm. In particular, it highlights deficiencies found in the firm’s quality controls 
and instances of non-compliance. The review team writes a report, similar to an audit report, 
which may unqualified or modified. In some cases, quality control deficiencies or non- 
compliance may be detected but do not warrant a modified report. However, whenever 
deficiencies in, and/or non-compliance with, controls are found, the review team issues a letter 
of comments which refers to matters that require corrective action. The review report and 
letter of comments are sent to the firm’s managing partner, and the relevant peer review or 
quality review committee is informed the review is complete. The firm is required to send a 
copy of the report, the letter of comments and any response it wishes to make to the relevant 
review committee. For all peer reviews, the report, letter of comments and any response made 
by the firm are filed in the AICPA’s public files. Reports and comments arising from a quality 
review are submitted on a confidential basis to the relevant AICPA State society’s quality 
review committee. 
If a firm subject to peer review receives a modified report, the relevant peer review 
committee reviews the report, the letter of comments and any response made by the firm and 
decides on appropriate action. This may include an instruction to correct detected deficiencies, 
a follow-up peer review, a requirement for staff members to undertake additional continuing 
professional education, a tine, censure, or suspension from the relevant practice section. If a 
modified report follows a quality review, the action taken by the State society’s quality review 
committee depends on the firm’s plan for corrective action. Realistic plans are taken at face 
value but some form of monitoring may be imposed to give the committee assurance that the 
plans are implemented (Loscalzo 1979; CPA Journal 1989). 
Surveys of peer review reports and letters of comments (e.g. CPA Journal 1987; Evers 
and Pearson 1990; Wallace and Wallace 1990) suggest that peer review has been beneficial in 
that deficiencies in CPA firms’ quality control procedures have been detected and, generally, 
corrected. The impact which peer review may have on the quality of CPAs’ professional work 
may be gleaned from an incident reported by Evers and Pearson (1990) in relation to the 
absence of proper consultation: “After one review, two of the firm’s public clients had to 
restate their financial statements because the firm failed to consult with others about the 
proper accounting for a complex related-party transaction it had not dealt with before”. 
According to Evers and Pearson (1990), who’surveyed the results of reviews conducted 
during 1986 and 1987, the most commonly encountered deficiencies relate to supervision 
(found in 83% of reviewed firms), inspection (30% of firms) and consultation (18% of firms). 
Inadequate documentation was responsible for a significant number of the deficiencies: for 
example, in relation to supervision, 11% of firms were found to have documented inadequately 
the performance of key audit procedures or conclusions reached in key accounting and 
auditing areas. Wallace and Wallace (1990) similarly note that over one third of the 232 files 
they examined covering peer reviews conducted between 1980 and 1986 contained comments 
relating to inadequate documentation. 
United Kingdom 
In the U.K., monitoring of auditors’ work became a requirement under the Companies 
Act 1989. Since 199 1 (1992 in the Republic of Ireland and 1993 in Northern Ireland), only 
registered auditors may be appointed as company auditors. Such auditors may be either 
individuals who, or firms which, are registered with a Recognised Supervisory Body (RSB). In 
order to become a RSB, a professional body must have rules covering, inter alia, auditors 
being fit and proper persons, technical standards applying to audit work, and procedures for 
maintaining competence, monitoring and enforcing the rules, investigating complaints and 
meeting claims arising out of audit work. Thus, monitoring auditors’ compliance with auditing 
standards and other rules is a condition of a professional body gaining RSB status. 
At present there are five SRBs, namely, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW), the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS), the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI), the Chartered Association of Certified 
Accountants (ACCA), and the Association of Authorised Public Accountants (AAPA). Their 
monitoring function is discharged by two units: the Joint Monitoring Unit (JMU), which 
operates on behalf of the three Institutes, and the ACCA unit which monitors auditors 
registered with the two Associations. The monitoring is performed by full-time staff of the 
monitoring units. 
The focus of monitoring is the audit firm. At 3 1 December 1995 there were about 
12,700 registered audit firms in the U.K. and Ireland but the number and profile of firms 
registered with the three Institutes and two Associations differed markedly. Some 9650 firms 
were registered with the Institutes: about 65.5% were sole practitioners, 34% had between 2 
and 50 principals, and 0.5% (16 firms) had more than 50 principals. Further, 147 (1.5%) firms 
had listed company clients. By comparison, about 3050 firms were registered with the 
Associations; approximately 81% were sole.practitioners and the remaining 19% had between 
2 and 50 principals. Few of the Associations’ audit firms had listed clients (ICAEW et al. 1995; 
ACCA 1995). It is possibly because of differences in the number, size and nature of audit firms 
registered with the Institutes and Associations, respectively, that initially the IhKJ and ACCA 
monitoring unit approached the task of sampling firms for monitoring rather differently. The 
IMU differentiated between firms with and those without public interest clients and developed 
a policy of visiting annually about 30 (20%) firms with listed clients and a random sample of 
about 150 (1.5 %) other firms.3 The ACCA monitoring unit sought to review 20% of its audit 
firms each year. According to Moizer (1994) the difference in the sampling approaches of the 
two monitoring units reflects a difference in their intent: “The purpose of the [JMUj visits has 
been to gather evidence on what is wrong [in the few firms visited] and then to educate all the 
audit firms registered with the three Chartered Institutes to correct the identified weaknesses. 
. ..The purpose of the visit [is] not primarily to improve the practices of the firm visited, but to 
improve the practices of the general population. In contrast, the ACCA and AAPA have taken 
the view that the monitoring process is concerned primarily with improving the quality of each 
firm visited”. 
In 1995, the JMSJ adopted a new risk-based approach to monitoring. This involves: 
i) conducting a ‘desk top’ analytical review of detailed annual returns submitted to the 
JMU by all audit firms registered with the three Institutes. This is designed to highlight 
areas of concern; 
ii) visiting each year: 
- about 30 (20%) firms with listed clients (as previously); 
- 1000 firms without listed clients. These are selected primarily on the basis of ‘risk 
indicators’ which are applied in the desk top reviews of the annual returns but 
some are chosen at random as a means of checking on the review process (ICAEW 
1996b). 
With this approach, Institute registered audit firms with non-listed clients can expect a routine 
monitoring visit once every eight years- instead of once every 65 years as under the former 
regime. Monitoring visits to ACCA and AAPA registered auditors and Institute registered 
firms with listed clients remain at once every five years (ICAEW 1996b; ICAEW et al. 1995; 
Moizer 1994). 
The remit of the monitoring units is to ascertain whether registered auditors are 
complying with the audit regulations. Thus, their monitoring activities embrace matters such as 
the fit and proper status of audit principals and employees, audit work being conducted 
competently and with integrity, maintenance of independence, adherence to auditing standards, 
regular reviews of compliance with the regulations, and the adequacy of professional 
indemnity insurance. 
A IMU visit focuses on the firm’s audit compliance review (ACR) and any areas of risk 
identified in the desk top analysis of the firm’s annual return. To check the firm’s ACR, the 
inspectors reperform a selection of audit file reviews undertaken by the firm and also review a 
selection of other files. Training and appraisal records, and extracts from manuals, are 
generally also reviewed (ICAEW 1996b). 
At the conclusion of the visit, the JMU inspectors meet with the firm’s audit compliance 
principal (and such others the firm wishes to be present) to discuss their findings and, where 
applicable, the firm’s proposed corrective action. The firm is required to submit notes of the 
closing meeting to the JMU, detailing the visit’s findings and any agreed corrective action. The 
JMSJ then prepares a report. Where no matters requiring correction are found, or minor 
problems were encountered but the JMU is satisfied with the firm’s corrective measures,, the 
JMU or Secretariat of the relevant Institute conveys this to the firm. The relevant Institute’s 
Audit Registration Committee (ARC) is also informed. Where problems which may prompt 
regulatory action are encountered, a copy of the IMU’s report is sent to the firm and the latter 
is requested to comment. The firm’s closing meeting notes, the IMU’s report and the firm’s 
comments thereon, are then sent to the relevant Institute’s ARC. The ARC reviews the 
documents and decides on appropriate regulatory action. It may accept the’firm’s proposals to 
correct the deficiencies and/or impose other requirements. If the ARC considers a firm’s non- 
compliance with the audit regulations is serious but does not warrant de-registration, it usually 
requires a follow-up visit by the JMU to confirm that remedial action has been taken. The 
ARC may also impose conditions on the firm’s registration (e.g. it may prohibit the firm from 
accepting new audit clients) or, alternatively, withdraw a firm’s registration (ICAEW 1996b). 
In 1995, of the 1165 routine visits made by the JMU, 62% did not require referral to the 
ARCS, 20% resulted in the ARC requiring specified improvements and 8% resulted in the 
ARCS placing restrictions on the firm’s registration. In 2% of cases registration was 
withdrawn and a further 3% of firms surrendered their registration following the IMU’s visit 
(ICAEW 1996a; ICAEW et al. 1995). 
The most common deficiencies encountered by the JMU relate to lack of evidence of 
audit planning, lack of assessment of the adequacy of clients’ accounting systems, audit reports 
not complying with the auditing standard, and failure to ensure that required financial 
disclosures have been made (ICAEW et al. 1993; Moizer 1994). However, since the 
commencement of monitoring, the JMU has noted a significant improvement in audit firms’ 
performance, especially in the areas of audit planning and the provision of audit evidence to 
support an audit opinion. As noted above, 62% of firms visited in 1995 had no matters 
requiring referral to the ARCS. This compares with 33% in 1994 and 46% in 1993-and was 
achieved, notwithstanding that, in 1995, the majority of firms visited were identified by the 
desk top review of annual returns as potentially having areas of concern (ICAEW et al. 1994; 
1995). 
Monitoring by the ACCA unit follows essentially the same process as that adopted by 
the JMU. However, the ACCA unit seeks to grade audit firms into one of four categories as 
follows: Grade A - satisfactory; Grade B - less than satisfactory but an early revisit is a low 
priority; Grade C - less than satisfactory, an early revisit is required; Grade D - unsatisfactory, 
to be referred to the Authorisation Committee (ACCA 1992; 1993). While all JMU visits 
likely to result in regulatory action are referred to the relevant Institute’s ARC (i.e. all cases 
equivalent to those receiving Grade C or D by the ACCA’s unit), only those resulting in Grade 
D from an ACCA unit visit are referred to the relevant Authorisation Committee (AC). 
During the year to 3 1 December 1995, the ACCA unit monitored 394 firms: 54% were 
classed as Grade A, 16% as Grade B, 14% as Grade C, and 16% as Grade D (ACCA 1995). 
The main problems encountered derive primarily from inadequate planning and recording of 
audit work and inadequate assessment and documentation of clients’ accounting systems 
(ACCA 1995). Like the JMU, the ACCA unit has noted a general improvement in audit firms’ 
performance. In 1995, 54% of firms were found to be satisfactory compared with 44% and 
49% in 1993 and 1994, respectively. However, the proportion of firms referred to the AC for 
unsatisfactory performance in 1995 (16%) was greater than that in 1993 (10%) but less than in 
1994 (18%) (ACCA 1995). 
Unlike peer review reports in the U.S., the IMU and ACCA unit’s reports are not 
accessible to the public; further, at present, there is no provision for public scrutiny of the 
monitoring process by a body similar to the POB. However, in cases where regulatory action 
seems appropriate, the JMU reports are reviewed by the Institutes’ ARCS and these include 
non-accountant members. The Institutes view the inclusion of such members as important “in 
order to demonstrate [their] determination to act in the public interest even where that may 
conflict with members’ interests in the short term” (ICAEW et al. 1993). The Associations’ 
monitoring process does not provide for public representation. Monitoring visit reports are 
reviewed by the Associations’ ACs if the firm is classed as Grade D, but these committees do 
not include non-accountants. However, the situation is poised for change as the professional 
accountancy bodies in the U.K. and Republic of Ireland have agreed that an “independent 
body should be established to . ..consider and review the extent to which the different schemes 
of regulation and discipline of the [accountancy bodies] serve the public interest in enhancing 
and maintaining the standards of work of professional accountants” (RRIWP 1996). The 
proposed Review Board will have oversight, amongst other things, of the monitoring- of 
registered auditors. 
Canada4 
In Canada, each State’s Institute of Chartered Accountants (ICA) has implemented its 
own Practice Review program but differences between the States are minor. The scheme 
operating in Alberta is used here as a representative example. 
In Alberta, every accountants’ office registered with the ICA of Alberta (ICAA) is 
subject to practice review once every four years. The reviews are conducted by full-time staff 
of the ICAA supplemented by practising ICAA members who are contracted by the ICAA to 
conduct reviews. Unlike peer review in the U.S. and monitoring in the U.K., the scope of 
practice review does not embrace compliance with membership/registration requirements but it 
covers both accounting and auditing practices. Its purpose is to determine whether the 
reviewed offtce’s practices comply with the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants’ 
(CICA) accounting and auditing standards and the ICAA’s Rules of Professional Conduct. In 
order to achieve this objective, practice reviews focus on “evaluat[ing] whether a reviewed 
office’s quality control policies and procedures for its accounting and auditing practice are 
appropriately comprehensive and suitably designed” (ICAA 1994~). 
Prior to a review visit, the reviewee completes a Confidential Information Questionnaire. 
(CIQ). This is used to plan the visit and the files to be examined. During the visit, the office’s 
‘quality control policies and procedures are reviewed to determine whether they are 
appropriate, adequate and effectively communicated to all staff. Selected accounting and 
auditing engagement files are also examined to determine whether professional standards have 
been met. Any deviations from the standards are noted and discussed with the practitioner in 
charge of the review. 
The visit concludes with an exit interview at which the reviewers discuss their findings 
with the practitioner responsible for the review (and/or other partners and staff members). A 
draft report of the reviewers’ findings and any recommendations for improvement is then 
prepared and sent to the reviewed offtce for comment. The report and comments thereon are 
returned to the ICAA for consideration by the Practice Review Committee (PRC). The report 
is regarded as highly confidential and is presented to the PRC in a manner which protects the 
identity of the reviewee, its members and its clients. The reviewee may make oral 
representations to the PRC if it so wishes but, in this event, it loses its anonymity. 
The PRC passes the reviewers’ report and its recommendations regarding the reviewee 
to the Joint Standards Directorate (JSD). A copy of the PRC’s recommendations is also sent to 
the reviewee. The JSD may accept, reject or modify the PRC’s recommendations and the 
reviewee is notified accordingly. Where reviewees are found not to be complying with the 
profession’s standards, a follow-up review is conducted within, 12 months of the initial review. 
The ICAA (1994a) notes: “it is expected that the [Practice Review] Committee’s 
recommendations will be implemented and . ..continued failure to improve standards, after 
sufficient follow-up reviews have been made, may result in the offtce being referred as a 
discipline complaint”. In conformity with the confidential nature of practice review, only the 
formal review report and CIQ are retained by the ICAA once an office has been found to 
comply with the profession’s standards and practice review fees are paid (ICAA 1994~). 
During the practice review cycle from 1990/l to 1993/4 some 86% of the 6 15 offices 
reviewed were found to be complying with the profession’s standards at their initial review, a 
further 11% were complying by their first follow-up review and another 1% were complying 
by their second follow-up visit. Thus, by the end of the review cycle, 98% of offtces were 
complying with the profession’s standards. However, nearly 2% of offices were referred to the 
disciplinary committee (ICAA 1994a). Given this data, it appears that practice review is an 
effective means of ensuring that practitioners comply with the profession’s accounting, 
auditing and ethical standards. The ICAA (1994b) observes: “the present system, which allows 
for follow-up review visits, has been very effective in helping members keep current and well 
informed on relevant professional matters”. 
New Zealand 
Practice review in N.Z. is similar to that in Canada but, in N.Z., the reviewee is not a CA 
offtce but an individual holding a public practice certificate of the NZSA. Nevertheless, all 
practitioners holding a public practice certificate who work in the same office are reviewed 
during the same practice review visit. Further, in N.Z., the review cycle is five not four years 
as in Canada, and the scope of the reviews includes compilation, review, and agreed-upon- 
procedures engagements in addition to accounting and auditing practices. However, it does 
not explicitly include compliance with the NZSA’s ethical guidelines. 
As in Canada, reviewers in N.Z. are till-time staff of the NZSA’s Practice Review Unit 
supplemented by experienced practitioners contracted to assist with the reviews. Prior to a 
visit, the reviewee is required to provide the reviewer(s) with a profile of his/her professional 
work. The reviewee may also provide information on the of&e’s quality control procedures 
and, if the reviewers consider these are effective and reliable the number of engagement files 
reviewed for each practitioner in the office is reduced accordingly. When reviewing the 
engagement files, the reviewers focus on the practitioner’s compliance or otherwise with the 
NZSA’s technical standards. 
At the conclusion of the review, the reviewers draft a report of their findings and, where 
applicable, make recommendations for improvement. Following discussions with the 
practitioner, a final report is sent to the NZSA’s Practice Review Board (PRB). This Board 
decides on appropriate action. It may be to take no further action, to require the reviewee to 
undertake additional continuing professional education, and/or to make improvements and be 
subject to a follow-up review (NZSA 1989b). As in Canada, the review process is regarded as 
highly confidential. The reviewee’s identity is not disclosed to the PRB and, in cases where no 
further action is required, the only record retained is that a review requiring no further action 
took place (NZSA 1989a). 
Between October 1990 (when Practice Review commenced in N.Z.) and June 1992, 
more than half of the practitioners subject to review were visited. In just 13% of cases no 
further action was required; 75% of those reviewed were required to send to the PRB, after a 
period of six months, a declaration of compliance with the NZSA’s technical standards and a 
set of financial statements; the remaining 12% of practitioners required a follow-up review 
(Gray 1992). According to Gray (1991), the Director of Practice Review, the main problem 
encountered by the reviewers was the inability of small practices to properly plan and 
document an audit. 
Like the ICAA, the NZSA has emphasised that the thrust of practice review is 
educational and that it seeks to raise practitioners’ professional work to acceptable standards 
without resorting to the disciplinary process. However, it states (NZSA 1989b): “If after a 
follow-up review the member has refused to cooperate in the review process, or has made no 
effort to implement the suggestions offered by the reviewer, then the [Practice Review] Board 
will be obliged to give serious consideration to whether or not to refer to the Investigation 
Committee a complaint against the member”. 
EVALUATION OF THE DIFFERING APPROACHES TO PEER REVIEW 
From the above descriptions of the operation of peer review in the U.S., U.K., Canada 
and N.Z., it is evident that significant differences exist. As is shown in figure 1, these apply, 
inter alia, in respect of the reviewee, reviewer, frequency of review visits, scope, 
confidentiality of review reports, the public’s representation in the process, and funding. These 
differences exist notwithstanding that, as noted earlier, the rationale, key objective and 
orientation of the schemes are very similar. Examining the differences in the light of the 
schemes’ rationale, objective and orientation provides insight into their effectiveness. 
Reviewee 
The key objective of peer review is to ensure that members of the profession comply 
with auditing and other professional standards. Thus, it might be expected that individual 
practitioners would be the focus of reviews. However, all of the professional bodies have 
adopted the view that, where a firm (or CA office) has effective and reliable quality controls, 
compliance is likely to be achieved. As a consequence, peer review has sought to examine a 
firm’s (or office’s) quality control policies and procedures, and compliance therewith by 
individual practitioners (as reflected in engagement files). Even in N.Z., where technically the 
reviewee is an individual practitioner, practitioners in any one office are reviewed at the same 
time, and the number of engagement files examined is directly affected by the quality of the 
controls operating within the office. In the U.S. and U.K., the reviewee is an audit firm. As a 
consequence, all the offices of multi-office firms are reviewed at the same time. This seems to 
Figure 1: Significant differences in the various peer review schemes 
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imply an assumption that the firm’s quality controls are implemented and adhered to uniformly 
in all offices of the firm. Certainly, some measure of uniformity may be expected as the firms 
have firm-wide quality control policies and procedures and they are also required to conduct 
internal quality reviews (or inspections). However, it is suggested that each office is likely to 
develop its own norms for standards of professional work and these may vary quite 
significantly from office to office. Given the objective of peer review and the above 
observations it is submitted that the most appropriate unit for peer review is a CA office as 
applies in Canada. 
Reviewer 
Flint (1988) notes that reviewers may be full-time staff of a regulatory or professional 
body (as in the U.K.), staff seconded from other firms at the request of the body responsible 
for the review, a combination of full-time staff and seconded practitioners (as in Canada and 
N.Z.), or another audit firm (as in the U.S.). Advantages and disadvantages attach to each 
option. For example, full-time staff of a regulatory or professional body may be regarded as 
independent and objective and as having no self-interest in a competitor’s audit files. Further, 
as Flint (1988) observes, “where the emphasis of [peer review] is educational . ..Ml-time staff 
of a professional body may be thought to be more appropriate and also more cost-effective”. 
However, both reviewees and outsiders may consider such reviewers to be insufficiently 
familiar with the practice issues they are reviewing. 
Where the review is conducted by another audit firm or by practitioners seconded from 
other firms, the reviewers should be familiar with practice issues but they may be regarded by 
outsiders as too sympathetic to practice problems and by reviewees as having unwelcome 
access to client files (Flint 1988). Additionally, concerns may arise about possible 
‘backscratching’. The likelihood of this occurring may be reduced, as in the U.S., by requiring 
the reviewee and reviewer to be independent of each other and by prohibiting reciprocal 
reviews. 
Given the objective of peer review, it is important that reviewers understand practice 
management and difficulties commonly encountered in securing compliance with quality 
controls and auditing (and other professional) standards. This suggests that practitioners from 
other firms are appropriate reviewers. However, given the declared educational orientation of 
peer review and Flint’s observation (above), full-time staff of the relevant professional body 
may be preferable. Following from this, it is suggested that a combination of full-time staff of 
the professional body supplemented by suitably qualified and experienced practitioners from 
other firms (as applies in Canada and N.Z.) is the most appropriate option. 
Frequency of visits 
The frequency of peer review visits ranges from three years in the U.S. to eight years for 
some firms in the U.K. (see figure 1). Given the rationale and objective of peer review, a 
review cycle of more than five years seems inappropriate. It is difficult to conceive how 
reviews conducted less frequently than once every five years can demonstrate to the public 
(and the government) that the profession is able to ensure its members provide high quality 
professional work and that members’ performance is adequately monitored. Given the dynamic 
nature of the corporate world, the rapid rate of change of accountancy firms (in particular, 
through mergers and disaggregations), and the rapid changes-which are occurring in auditing 
and accounting standards, a review cycle of even five years seems questionable. 
In 1993, peer review in the U.S. applied to 105,000 professionals in 1,214 firms in the 
SECPS alone, and these firms audited some 14,750 SEC clients (Moizer 1994). Thus, the 
extent of peer and quality review in the U.S. is far greater than in the U.K. (where about 150 
firms audit the 2500 or so listed companies), .Canada and N.Z.. Yet, in the U.S., a peer review 
cycle of three years is found (presumably) to be cost-beneficial. However, in the U.S., the [eve] 
of litigation against auditors is higher, and criticism of auditors by politicians such as 
Congressman Dingell is more widespread and scathing, than in the other countries. Thus the 
benefits of peer review in terms of restoring public and political confidence in the ability of the 
profession to regulate itself may be greater than elsewhere. Weighing these factors, and 
conscious that litigation against, and criticism of, auditors in countries other than the U.S. has 
risen sharply in recent years-particularly in the U.K.-it is suggested that a review cycle of 
three years is desirable. 
Scope of peer review 
It is evident from figure 1 that the scope of peer review varies from country to country. 
This paper is concerned with securing high quality audits and each of the peer review schemes 
under consideration includes monitoring auditors’ compliance with relevant technical 
standards. However, ensuring compliance with the profession’s ethical standards (including 
independence, integrity and competence) also seems to be relevant to securing high quality 
audits. This is embraced by.all of the schemes other than in N.Z. where attention is confined to 
compliance with technical standards. 
Confidentiality of peer review reports and public representation in the review process 
In all of the countries other than the U.S., peer review reports are kept confidential. 
Further, the public is represented in the peer review process only in the U.S. (where the POB 
has been established) and in the U.K. (where lay members are included on the Institutes’ 
ARCS). Given that peer review has been introduced primarily to restore public and political 
confidence in the profession and its ability to regulate its own affairs, the general absence of 
public involvement in the peer review process is difficult to understand. Even more difficult to 
understand are the measures taken in Canada and N.Z. to protect the identity of CA ofices 
and practitioners, respectively, found to be in breach of the profession’s standards. It may be 
that the professional bodies share Mautz’s (1984) view that “the issue of confidentiality is a 
complex one, involving private rights, the public interest, the litigious nature of our society 
and a widespread misunderstanding of the role, rights and responsibilities of . ..auditors”. It 
may also be that the professional bodies are concerned that, should the public become aware 
of deficient performance by auditors-as revealed in peer review reports-this would further 
undermine, rather than restore, public confidence in the profession and its work. A further 
concern expressed by Moizer (1994) is that, if the review reports are placed in the public 
. 
arena, this may result in less detailed and forthright reporting and thus in reduced effectiveness 
of the review process. 
Nevertheless, if public and political confidence in the profession’s ability to regulate itself 
is to be gained, the review process must be seen to be operating effectively: this requires the 
public to be represented in the process. The U.S. experience demonstrates that this can be 
achieved without the feared adverse consequences. Further, placing peer review files in the 
public domain has enabled detected deficiencies to be analysed, not just by the public but, 
more importantly, by academics and practitioners. The latter groups have used the reports to 
identify key, commonly occurring deficiencies and this has provided the basis for educating 
members of the profession and effecting general improvements in the quality of audit work. 
Additionally, the POB has given the review process in the U.S. a measure of credibility. As 
Wood and Sommer (1985) explain: “[Tlhe AICPA believed it was essential that a process 
conceived by the profession be subjected to oversight and review by people not associated 
with the profession. Thus, provision was made for a board of five experienced, competent and 
independent people mainly drawn fi-om fields other than accounting to oversee the process, to 
review how it functions, to criticize it when ,it needs criticizing, to report to the public on its 
warts and moles and, yes, its achievements”. The POB takes its role seriously: it monitors 
every aspect of the peer review program and its staff oversee every SECPS peer review 
(Wood and Sommer 1985). 
In the U.K., neither the ACCA nor the AAPA have provided for laypersons to be 
involved in the monitoring process but the Institutes include non-accountants on their ARCS. 
As members of these committees, the non-accountants review reports on registered auditors 
visited by the JMU. In 1992, the four non-accountant members of the ICAEW’s ARC included 
a report in the Institutes’ report to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) on audit 
regulation. In this they note that they see their role as, “firstly protecting the public interest 
and, secondly, protecting the interests of the firms”. They also report that, in their view, 
“decisions [of the ARC] have always been taken properly and fairly, and in the public interest” 
(ICAEW et al. 1992, 56). 
Unlike the POB, the laymembers of the ARCS do not have a remit to report to the 
public on the monitoring process but including a report in the Institutes’ annual report to the 
DTI seems to be a step in this direction. However, since 1992 such a report has not been 
included in the Institutes’ reports to the DTI. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the U.K. 
professional bodies plan to establish an independent Review Board to oversee the various 
bodies’ regulatory and disciplinary schemes. Assuming this Board will have independence and 
powers at least equal to those of the POB (as is proposed), it should increase significantly the 
credibility of the monitoring process in the U.K. 
Funding 
As is shown in figure 1, in the U.S. and Canada the cost of peer review is borne by the 
reviewees. In the U.K., the Institutes spread the cost across all registered auditors, the ACCA 
allocates it to all practising members, and the AAPA recoups it from all members. In N.Z., it is 
allocated progressively to members of the NZSA, members holding public practice certificates, 
and reviewees. 
Given that the intent of peer review is to restore public and political confidence in the 
profession’s ability to regulate itself and to ensure its members provide high quality 
professional work, it is suggested that all members of the profession stand to benefit from the 
peer review process. However, practitioners working in the areas covered by peer review 
(auditing in the U.K., auditing and other reporting engagements in the U.S., accounting and 
auditing in Canada, and accounting, auditing and other professional engagements in N.Z.) 
seem likely to gain additional benefits from education and advice provided as an outcome of 
the review process. In addition, reviewees, whose quality controls and engagement files are 
reviewed, seem likely to gain further benefits from having specific deficiencies detected. It is 
thus suggested that the pattern of funding adopted in N.Z., where the incidence of peer review 
costs reflects the benefits derived therefrom, is appropriate. It appears that in the other 
jurisdictions reviewees (or, in the U.K., registered auditors) carry too much of the burden. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PEER REVIEW 
Notwithstanding differences in the operation of the peer review schemes, the 
professional literature reveals that the schemes’ outcomes are remarkably similar. Surveys 
conducted in the various countries have found that, in general, practitioners consider that peer 
review has been educational and has resulted in an improvement in the quality of audit work. 
This improvement has been achieved primarily through improved quality control systems and 
documentation (e.g. Evers and Pearson 1990; Wallace and Wallace 1990; Gray 1992; Feamley 
and Page 1992, 1993; Moizer 1994). The deficiencies most frequently encountered by the 
reviewers-that of inadequate audit planning and, more particularly, documentation-are also 
common to all of the countries. The same applies to the high level of deficiencies detected, 
especially in small firms, during the initial round of reviews. Bruce’s (1993) observation that 
“audit regulators, while always fearing the worst, have been privately staggered at how bad so 
much of the audit work at the small end of the market has proved to be”, although written in 
relation to the U.K. could equally have been written about the initial findings of peer review in 
the U.S., Canada or N.Z.. Explaining the high incidence of inadequate documentation, the 
ACCA (1992) notes that, although auditing standards require auditors to document their audit 
work, historically compliance with this requirement, especially in small practices, has been 
poor. It states: “Discussions suggest that most auditors have carried out most of the necessary 
work, but they have not recorded it. . ..Small firms did not have the culture or structure of 
supervision and review which required them to make a detailed record of the work done and 
as a result there was little incentive to do so. The advent of audit monitoring has provided 
such an incentive”. 
Moizer (1994) is somewhat critical of the approach adopted by the peer review process 
and suggests that finding inadequate documentation is almost inevitable. He notes: “As a result 
of [the] difficulty of challenging the judgements made by an audit partner, the [reviewers] have 
not attempted to evaluate such judgements when assessing audit working papers . . .[they] have 
looked only at the documentary evidence available . . ..The [review process] has concentrated 
on testing whether firms have complied with audit standards and regulations. This approach 
inevitably leads the [review] process to be concerned with the documents produced by the 
firms”. However, Moizer’s implied conclusion that focusing on compliance with auditing 
standards does not facilitate evaluating the appropriateness of audit opinions, is subject to 
question. Wood and Sommer (1985), recounting achievements during the early years of 
SECPS peer reviews in the U.S., observe: “95 audits (out of some 3200 reviewed) were 
deemed to be substandard by the peer reviewers. In 17 cases, the firms were required to 
withdraw their opinions and have the financial statements revised and reissued.... In 15 cases, 
the auditors were required to perform the procedures they had improperly omitted”. 
As indicated above, the review process, with its focus on quality controls and 
documentation, has had greatest impact on small firms. Large firms, as a consequence of their 
size, have well-developed quality control systems and procedures for documenting audit work. 
Small firms often saw no need for such systems and procedures. Further, auditing standards 
are required to be adhered to in all external financial statement audits, irrespective of the size 
of the audit client. However, the standard-setting bodies are dominated by members drawn 
from the large accountancy firms (which have large audit clients) and large corporates (e.g. 
Porter 1991; Moizer 1994). Thus auditing standards have been set with large audit clients in 
mind: until recently, little attention seems to have been given to their application in a small 
client setting.5 Similarly, quality control standards, such as the AICPA’s Statement of Quality 
Control Standards No.1: System of Quality Controlfor a CPA Firm, have been developed to 
achieve desired results in large accountancy firms: little attention has been given to their 
suitability for small firms. Those conducting peer reviews may adjust the level of compliance 
with auditing and quality control standards expected of small firms (e.g. CPA Journal 1989) 
but, in all of the countries where it has been implemented, peer review has resulted in small 
firms developing (or upgrading) quality control systems and documentation procedures. This 
has resulted in high set-up costs for these firms. In a survey in the U.K. in 1992, Feamley and 
Page (1993) found that set-up costs for firms with three or fewer partners amounted to some 
E4900. It is not known whether these costs have generated commensurate benefits in terms of 
improved audit judgements. 
It is suggested that the educational, rather than punitive, orientation of peer review is, at 
least in part, a result of the professional bodies’ awareness of the unequal impact of peer 
review on small, vis ti vis large, firms. It is noticeable that during the initial years of peer 
review the educational aspects are emphasised and possible disciplinary action is downplayed. 
For example, when introducing practice review, the NZSA (1989b) stated: “It is intended the 
benefits arising from Practice Review will be educative and informative . . .Overseas experience 
reveals that the necessity to invoke disciplinary processes seldom arises”. Similarly, in its 
report to the DTI, the ACCA (1992) noted: “The Association sees its role in the early stages 
of monitoring as one of providing guidance and constructive advice to firms which are 
genuinely trying to improve”. However, once peer review has become established and firms 
have been given the opportunity to set their house in order, it seems likely that reviewers will 
be less tolerant of breaches of professional standards, and disciplinary action will feature more 
prominently. This is reflected, for example, in comments by Gray (1992) in N.Z.: “During the 
first five-year cycle, the [Practice Review] Unit’s basic approach has been to concentrate on 
ensuring that all those in practice have understood the rules and are given time to bring their 
standards up to the necessary level. The second five-year round may well see a firmer 
approach, less latitude being given to those with a cavalier approach to the standards”. 
It is also pertinent to note that, despite the professional bodies’ emphasis on the 
educative role of peer review, when reporting on its achievements attention is drawn to 
sanctions imposed on errant members. For example, in their report to the DTI (ICAEW et al. 
19933, the U.K. Institutes report: “of the 13 follow-up visits considered by the ARCS by 30 
September 1993, 5 resulted in the withdrawal of the firms’ registration. This clearly 
demonstrates that the ARCS will take decisive regulatory action where necessary by 
withdrawing registration”. Similarly, Wood and Sonuner (1985), state: “The self-regulatory 
[peer review] program has preventive, not punitive, effects _._ [However] the SECPS can, and 
does, take actions that are tantamount to sanctions. . ..Failure of a firm to take any corrective 
action deemed necessary by the peer review committee . ..can result in the most severe 
sanction available . ..expulsion of the firm from membership in the SECPS accompanied by 
public disclosure of this sanction”. 
It seems that, in trying to use peer review as a vehicle for both education and regulation, 
the professional bodies have conflicting interests which are difficult, if not impossible, to 
satisfy simultaneously. The same may be said of their trying to act as protector of both 
members’ and the public interest. Those who consider the professional bodies protect 
members’ interests at the expense of the public interest point to the large number of auditors 
who have been criticised in peer review reports and the few who have faced disciplinary action 
(e.g. Jack 1993). S UC arguments are re-inforced in countries other than the U.S. (and, to h 
some extent, the U.K.) by attention being drawn to the absence of public scrutiny in the review 
process. Those who contend that the public interest is protected at the expense of members’ 
interests note the high cost of regulation which is borne by members of the profession6 (Jack 
1993). 
Some commentators and politicians such as Dingell in the U.S. and Mitchell in the U.K. 
have suggested that auditing the performance of auditors is too important to be left to the 
auditing profession and that an independent regulatory body should be established. But, who 
would fund and operate such a body? As Bruce (1993) has pointed out: “If it came to the 
crunch any government would run a mile from direct supervision and control. If you can get 
the profession to come up with its own millions to pay for the scheme why bother the 
taxpayer? And, more important, this way round you can blame the profession whenever 
anything goes wrong”. 
Viewed in this light, practitioners may well question the high price paid by the profession 
for the right to self regulation. Such questions become more pointed when it is remembered 
that, particularly in the U.K., the profession has been granted the right to regulate its own 
affairs-providing it does so within the parameters set by government. In the U.S., the 
profession is less bounded than in the U.K. with respect to its self-regulatory activities, but the 
watchful eye of the SEC is never far away and one of the functions of the POB is to report to 
the SEC on the effectiveness of peer review. In Canada and N.Z., at the present time, the 
profession is able to regulate itself comparatively free from government pressures. This may 
explain the extreme levels of confidentiality which are maintained in the review process in 
these countries. As noted earlier, the anonymity of reviewees is protected even from the 
committees responsible for reviewing practice review reports. It is suggested that this level of 
protection of members’ interests leaves the profession open to allegations of putting members’ 
interests ahead of the interests of those who rely on auditors’ work. 
CONCLUSION 
Peer review was introduced by the accounting profession in the U.S., U.K., Canada and 
N.Z. primarily as a response to widespread criticism of auditors and the threat of government 
intervention in the profession’s affairs. The schemes differ in their modus operandi but their 
results are remarkably similar. In each case, the initial reviews found a high incidence of non- 
compliance with the profession’s standards (particularly in small firms) especially in respect of 
audit planning, control and, more particularly, documentation. Surveys have shown that, in 
general, reviewees consider that the review process has prompted improvements in their 
quality control systems and auditing procedures. Whether it has also resulted in improved 
audit judgements is a moot point (e.g. Moizer 1994; Feamley and Page 1994). However, it 
may be argued that, with improved audit planning, review and documentation, critical steps in 
the audit process and vital clues in the evidence gathered of matters requiring closer scrutiny, 
are less likely to be missed. Further, as noted earlier, at least in the U.S., peer review has 
uncovered instances.of faulty audit judgements and resulted in revised audit opinions. In most 
instances, the outcome of peer review has been less dramatic but, nonetheless, wherever it has 
been introduced, it has uncovered numerous instances of non-compliance with professional 
standards-and generated numerous suggestions for improvements in audit procedures and 
practice management. It is also likely that the ‘threat’ of review visits has motivated 
practitioners to effect improvements in their control systems and audit procedures prior to the 
visit. Further, the professional bodies, when reporting on the effectiveness of their peer review 
schemes, have drawn attention to the large number of reviewees who received qualified or 
adverse reports on their initial reviews but who ‘cleaned up their act’ before the follow-up visit. 
The professional bodies have also noted that members who persist in defective performance 
are disciplined and, if necessary, excluded from the profession. 
Given the improvements which peer review has apparently brought, it may be asked why 
audit failures still occur. In answer, commentators such as Wood and Sommer (1985) note 
that it is not known how many audit failures have been avoided as a result of auditors being 
required to conform to prescribed standards. They also point out that peer review focuses on 
quality control systems and that no system can prevent all undesirable events from occurring. 
Woodley (1991) echoed this theme when, on the eve of peer review being introduced in the 
U.K., he stated: “It would be foolish to believe that there will be no audit failures in the future. 
No amount of monitoring can eliminate the possibility of errors of judgement or failures to 
follow laid down procedures. But . ..the extra emphasis on quality control procedures, the 
possibility of a [peer review] visit, and the dire consequences of failing to comply with the 
regulations [should] result in fewer audit failures in the future”. Wood and Sommer (1985), 
amongst others, also note that, although peer review cannot prevent all errors from occurring, 
society has other checks in place to ensure those responsible for causing harm to others as a 
result of sub-standard work do not go unpunished. For example, when questions of audit 
. failure arise, authorities such as the SEC in the U.S. and DTI in the U.K. investigate and, if 
justified, appropriate sanctions are imposed on the culprits. Additionally, except in the U.K. 
where the Caparo decision may operate to preclude legal action by third parties, those 
harmed as a result of auditors’ sub-standard work may seek redress through the courts. 
The findings of peer review suggest that prior to its introduction auditors’ performance 
was, in many cases, not in accord with the profession’s standards. It seems that public and 
political criticism of auditors was not without foundation. The peer review process has 
apparently raised the overall quality of audit work-especially at the small end of the 
market-and-is also weeding out those who persistently refuse to meet the required standards. 
However, it is submitted that, if the public is to be assured that the auditing profession is 
adequately auditing the quality of members’ work, the peer review process must not only be 
effective, it must be seen to be effective. This necessitates exposing the process to public 
scrutiny. If peer review is to achieve its aim of restoring and maintaining public and political 
confidence in the profession and its work, at the least, a body equivalent to the POB in the 
U.S. needs to be established to oversee the regulatory process. 
ENDNOTES 
1. In this paper, the term peer review is used to mean peer and quality reviews in the U.S., 
monitoring in the U.K. and practice review in Canada and N.Z. 
2. Firms which do not qualify for membership of the Division of CPA firms but have at least 
one AICPA member must join the Quality Review Program. The peer review program, to 
which all firms belonging to the Division of CPAs are subject, operates on a national basis. 
The quality review program is run by the AICPA State societies. 
3. In addition to visiting firms, the JMU required all audit firms registered with the three 
Institutes to file annually a detailed return. This provided information on matters such as 
the number of principals and employees, ownership and control of the firm, number and 
nature of audit clients, fee income, fit and proper status of prjncipals and employees, 
maintenance of principals’ and employees’ competence, and audit compliance reviews 
conducted by the firm (JMU, 1994). 
4. The quality review programmes introduced in Australia by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia in 1991, and the Society of Accountants in 1993, are based on the 
practice review scheme in Canada. Thus the description of practice review in Canada 
applies in all essential details to the schemes operating in Australia. The primary difference 
is that a five year review cycle applies in Australia, compared to a four year cycle in 
Canada. 
5. In recent times, the professional bodies have considered this issue; e.g. in 1996, the U.K. 
Auditing Practices Board issued a Consultation Draft of a Practice Note: The audit of smail 
businesses. 
6. In 1995 the cost of monitoring in the U.K. alone was nearly 24.5 mill (ICAEW et al. 1995; 
ACCA 1995). 
REFERENCES 
Accountancy. 1987. New peer review plans unveiled. Accountancy (October): 8. 
Accountancy. 1996. More court actions soon. Accountancy (January): 9. 
Benson, Sir H. 1980. The professions: setting and enforcing standards. Chartered Accountant 
in Australia (June): 25-29. 
Bruce, R. 1993. Cornering the duds at the corner shop. The Times (21 January): 27. 
Chartered Association of Certified Accountants (ACCA). 1992. Audit Regulation: First 
Annual Report of The Chartered Association of CertiJied Accountants to the President of 
the Board of Trade. London: ACCA. 
Chartered Association of Certified Accountants (ACCA). 1993. Audit Regulation: Second 
Annual Report of The Chartered Association of Certtjied Accountants to the President of 
the Board of Trade. London: ACCA. 
Cook, J. M., and H. G. Robinson. 1979. Peer review-The accounting profession’s program. 
CPA Journal (March): 11-16. 
CPA Journal. 1987. News and Views: Members of Division for CPA firms of the AICPA 
report on the benefits of peer review. CPA Journal (September): 4, 6. 
CPA Journal. 1989. News and Views: Quality review or peer review-What’s the difference? 
CPA Journal (November): 6,8. 
Economist. 1994. Partners in pain. The Economist (9 July): 61-62. 
Evers, C. J., and D. B. Pearson. 1990. Lessons learned from peer review. Singapore 
Accountant (June): 19-23. 
Feamley, S., and M. Page. 1992. Counting the cost of audit regulation. Accountancy 
(January): 2 l-22. 
Fearnley, S., and M. Page. 1993. Audit regulation-one year on. Accountancy (January): 59- 
60. 
Fearnley, S., and M. Page. 1994. Audit regulation--where are we now? Accountancy 
(March): 8 l-82. 
Flint, D. 1980. Quality control policies and procedures-the prospect for peer review. ‘I;he 
Accountant’s Magazine (February): 63-66. 
Flint, D. 1988. Philosophy and Principles of Auditing. London: MacMillan. 
Gray, P. 199 1. Practice review progress. Accountants ’ Journal (June): 24-25. 
Gray, P. 1992. Practice review-Is it working? Accountants ‘Journal (November): 20-2 1. 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Alberta (ICAA). 1994a. Summary of practice review 
policies and procedures. ICAA Members’Handbook: Section C, 3-5. 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Alberta (ICAA). 1994b. Practice Review Ad Hoc 
Committee Report: Executive Summary, 3-5. 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Alberta (ICAA). 1994~. Practice Review Procedures. 
Alberta: ICAA. 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). 1996a.. Audit News 
(May). London: ICAEW. 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). 1996b. Audit New 
(August). London: ICAEW. 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland (ICAS), Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI). 
1992. Audit Regulation: Report to the DTI for the Year Ended 30 September I992. 
London: ICAEW, ICAS, ICAI. 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland (ICAS), Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI). 
1993. Audit Regulation: Report to the DTI for the Year Ended 30 September 1993. 
London: ICAEW, ICAS, ICAI. 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland (ICAS), Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI). 
1995. Audit Regulation Report to the DTI for the Year to 3I December 1995. London: 
ICAEW, ICAS, ICAI. 
Jack, A. 1993. Auditors called to account. Financial Times (3 February): 22 
Joint Monitoring Unit. 1994. Chartered Accountants Audit Annual Return. London: JMU. 
Kemp, R. 1993. Self regulation and the Jh4U. Association of International Accountants 
Newsletter (October): 6. 
Localzo, M. A. 1979. What is peer review all about? The Journal of Accountancy 
(October): 78-82. 
Mautz, R. K. 1983. Self-regulation-Perils and problems. Journal of Accountancy (May): 76- 
84. 
Mautz, R. K. 1984. Self-regulation-Criticisms and a response. Journal of Accountancy 
(April): 56-66. 
Moizer, P. 1994. Review of Recognised Supervisory Bodies: A Report to the Department of 
Trade and Industry on the Audit Monitoring Process. 
New Zealand Society of Accountants (NZSA). 1989a. Practice Review: Questions and 
Answers. Wellington: NZSA.’ 
New Zealand Society of Accountants (NZSA). 1989b. Practice Review: Proposals for 
Quality Control. Wellington: NZSA. 
O’Leary, T., and Jr, R. J. Boland. 1987. Self-regulation, public interest and the accounting 
profession. Research in Accounting Regulation 1: 103- 12 1. 
Porter, B. A. 1991. A Peep Behind the Scenes of Standard Setting in New Zealand. 
Unpublished paper presented at the Third Asia-Pacific Conference on International 
Accounting Issues, Hawaii, October 199 1. 
Regulation Review Implementation Working Party (RRIWP). 1996. Consultation Paper 
Issued by the Regulation Review Implementation Working Party. London Consultative 
Committee of the Accountancy Bodies (CCAB). 
Russell, G. 1986. All eyes on accountants. Time Magazine (21 April): 58. 
Schiel, Jr, R. D. 1991. Peer review: Making it work. Journal of Accounting Education 9: 161- 
166. 
Wallace, W. A. 1991. Peer review filings and their implications for evaluating self regulation. 
Auditing: i3eor-y and Practice (Spring): 53-68. 
Wallace, W. A., and J. J. Wallace. 1990. Learning from peer review. CPA Journal (May): 48- 
53. 
Woodley, K. 1991. Introducing audit regulation. Accountancy (January): 60-61. 
Wood, A. M., and Jr, A. A. Sommer. 1985. Statements in quotes. Journal of Accountancy 
(May): 122-131. 
CRANFIELD SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
List No 6, 1992 
SWP l/92 Mike Sweeney 
“How to Perform Simultaneous Process 
Engineering” 
SWP 2192 Paul Bums 
“The Management of General Practice” 
SWP 3192 Paul Bums 
“Management in General Practice: A Selection 
of Articles” 
SWP 4/92 Simon Knox & David Walker 
“Consumer Involvement with Grocery Brands” 
SWP 5/92 Deborah Helman & Adrian Payne 
“Internal Marketing: Myth versus Reality?” 
SWP 6/92 Leslie de Chematony & Simon Knox 
“Brand Price Recall and the Implications for 
Pricing Research” 
SWP 7192 Shai Vyakarnam 
“Social Responsibility in the UK Top 100 
Companies” 
SWP 8/92 Susan Baker, Simon Knox & Leslie de 
Chernatony 
“Product Attributes and Personal Values: A 
Review of Means-End Theory and Consumer 
Behaviour” 
SWP 9192 Mark Jenkins 
“Making Sense of Markets: A Proposed 
Research Agenda” 
SWP lo/92 Mike Sweeney & Ian Oram 
“Information Technology for Management 
Education: The Benefits and Barriers” 
SWP 1 l/92 Keith Thompson (Silsoe College) 
“International Competitiveness and British 
Industry post-1992. With Special Reference to 
the Food Industry” 
SWP 12/92 Keith Thompson (Silsoe College) 
“The Response of British Supermarket 
Companies to the Internationalisation of the 
Retail Grocery Industry” 
SWP 13192 Richard Kay 
“The Metaphors of the Voluntary/Non-Profit 
Sector Organising” 
SWP 14/92 Robert Brown & Philip Poh 
“Aniko Jewellers Private Limited - Case Study 
and Teaching Notes” 
SWP 15/92 Mark Jenkins & Gerry Johnson 
“Representing Managerial Cognition: The Case 
for an Integrated Approach” 
SWP 16/92 Paul Bums 
“Training across Europe: A Survey of Small 
and Medium-Sized Companies in Five 
European Countries” 
SWP 17/92 Chris Brewster & Henrik Holt Larsen 
“Human Resource Management in Europe - 
Evidence from Ten Countries” 
SWP 18/92 Lawrence Cummings 
“Customer Demand for ‘Total Logistics 
Management’ - Myth or Reality?” 
SWP 19/92 Ariane Hegewisch & Irene Btuegel 
“Flexibilisation and Part-time Work in Europe” 
SWP 20192 Kevin Daniels & Andrew Guppy 
“Control, Information Seeking Preference, 
Occupational Stressors and Psychological 
Well-being” 
SWP 2 l/92 Kevin Daniels & Andrew Guppy 
“Stress and Well-Being in British University 
Staff’ 
SWP 22/92 Colin Armistead & Graham Clark 
“The Value Chain in Service Operations 
Strategy” 
SWP 23192 David Parker 
“Nationalisation, Privatisation, and Agency 
Status within Government: Testing for the 
Importance of Ownership” 
SWP 24192 John Ward 
“Assessing and Managing the Risks of IS/IT 
Investments” 
SWP 25192 Robert Brown 
“Stapleford Park: Case Study and Teaching 
Notes” 
SWP 26/92 Paul Burns & Jean Harrison 
“Management in General Practice - 2” 
SWP 27/92 Paul Bums & Jean Harrison 
“Management in General Practice - 3” 
SWP 28192 Kevin Daniels, Leslie de Chernatony & 
Gerry Johnson 
“Theoretical and Methodological Issues 
concerning Managers’ Mental Models of 
Competitive Industry Structures” 
SWP 29192 Malcolm Harper & Alison Rieple 
“Ex-Offenders and Enterprise” 
SWP 30192 Colin Armistead & Graham Clark 
“Service Quality: The Role of Capacity 
Management” 
SWP 3 l/92 Kevin Daniels & Andrew Guppy 
“Stress, Social Support and Psychological 
Well-Being in British Chartered Accountants” 
SWP 32192 Kevin Daniels & Andrew Guppy 
“The Dimensional@ and Well-Being 
Correlates of Work Locus of Control’ 
SWP 33192 David Ballantyne, Martin Christopher, 
Adrian Payne and Moira Clark 
“The Changing Face of Service Quality 
Management” 
SWP 34192 Chris Brewster 
“Choosing to Adjust: UK and Swedish 
Expatriates in Sweden and the UK” 
SWP 35192 Robert Brown 
“Goldsmiths Fine Foods - Case Study and 
Teaching Notes” 
SWP 36192 Mike Sweeney 
“Strategic Manufacturing Management: 
Restructuring Wasteful Production to World 
Class” 
SWP 37192 Andy Bailey & Gerry Johnson 
“An Integrated Exploration of Strategic 
Decision-Making” 
SWP 38192 Chris Brewster 
“European Human Resource Management: 
Reflection of, or Challenge to, the American 
Concept” 
SWP 39192 Ute Hanel, Kurt Volker, Ariane Hegewisch 
& Chris Brewster 
“Personnel Management in East Germany” 
SWP 40192 Lawrence Cummings 
“Logistics goes Global - The Role of Providers 
and Users” 
SWP 42192 Susan Segal-Horn 
“The Logic of International Growth for Service 
Firms” 
SW 43192 Mike Sweeney 
“Benchmarking for Strategic Manufacturing 
Management” 
SWP 44192 Paul Bums 
“Financing SMEs in Europe: A Five Country 
Study” 
SWP 45192 Robert Brown 
“The Graduate Enterprise Programme - Has it 
been Worthwhile?” 
CRANFIELD WORKING PAPERS 
List No 7, 1993 
SWP l/93 John Mapes 
“The Effect of Limited Production Capacity on 
Safety Stock Requirements for Periodic Review 
Inventory Systems” 
SWP 2193 Shai Vyakamam & Alison Rieple 
“Corporate Entrepreneurship: A Review” 
SWP 3193 Cliff Bowman & David Faulkner 
“Pushing on a String: Uncertain Outcomes 
from Intended Competitive Strategies” 
SWP 4193 Susan Baker & Mark Jenkins 
“The Role of Values in the Design and 
Conduct of Management Research: 
Perspectives on Managerial and Consumer 
Cognition” 
SWP 5193 Kevin Daniels, Leslie de Chernatony & 
Gerry Johnson 
“Validating a Method for Mapping Managers’ 
Mental Models of Competitive Industry 
Structures” 
SWP 6193 Kevin Daniels & Andrew Guppy 
“Occupational Stress, Social Support, Job 
Control and Psychological Well-Being” 
SWP 7193 Colin Fletcher, Ruth Higginbotham & Peter 
Norris 
“The Inter-Relationships of Managers’ Work 
Time and Personal Time” 
SWP 8193 Mike Sweeney 
“A Framework for the Strategic Management 
of both Service and Manufacturing Operations” 
SWP 4 l/92 Roger Seaton & Martin Cordey-Hayes 
“Interactive Models of Industrial Technology 
Transfer: A Process Approach” 
SWP 9/93 Colin Armistead & Graham Clark 
“The ‘Coping’ Capacity Management Strategy 
in Services and the Influence on Quality 
Performance” 
SWP lo/93 Ariane Hegewisch 
“Equal Opportunities Policies and 
Developments in Human Resource 
Management: A Comparative European 
Analysis” 
SWP 1 l/93 Paula Stanley 
“Service to the Courts: The Offender’s 
Perspective“ 
SWP 12/93 Mark Jenkins 
“Thinking about Growth: A Cognitive 
Mapping Approach to Understanding Small 
Business Development” 
SWP 13193 Mike Clarke 
“Metro-Freight: The Automation of Freight 
Transportation” 
SWP 14/93 John Hailey 
“Growing Competitiveness of Corporations 
from the Developing World: Evidence from the 
South” 
SWP 15193 Noeleen Doherty, Shaun Tyson & Claire 
Viney 
“A Positive Policy? Corporate Perspectives on 
Redundancy and Outplacement” 
SWP 16193 Shai Vyakamam 
“Business Plans or Plans for Business” 
SWP 17/93 Mark Jenkins, Eric le Cerf& Thomas Cole 
“Defining the Market: An Exploration of 
Marketing Managers’ Cognitive Frameworks” 
SWP 18/93 John Hailey 
“Localisation and Expatriation: The 
Continuing Role of Expatriates in Developing 
Countries” 
SWP 19/93 Kevin Daniels & Andrew Guppy 
“Reversing the Occupational Stress Process: 
Some Consequences of Employee 
Psychological Well-Being” 
SWP 20193 Paul Burns, Andrew Myers & Andy Bailey 
“Cultural Stereotypes and Barriers to the 
Single Market” 
SWP 21193 Terry Lockhart & Andrew Myers 
“The Social Charter: Implications for 
Personnel Managers” 
SWP 22/93 Kevin Daniels, Gerry Johnson & Leslie de 
Chematony 
“Differences in Cognitive Models of Buyers 
and Sellers” 
SWP 23193 Peter Boey & Richard Saw 
“Evaluation of Automated Warehousing 
Policies: Total Systems Approach” 
SWP 24/93 John Hailey 
“Training for Entrepreneurs: International 
Perspectives on the Design of Enterprise 
Development Programmes” 
SWP 25/93 Tim Denison & Simon Knox 
“Pocketing the Change from Loyal Shoppers: 
The Double Indemnity Effect” 
SWP 26193 Simon Knox 
“Consumers and Grocery Brands: Searching 
for Attitudes - Behaviour Correspondence at 
the Category Level” 
SWP 27193 Simon Knox 
“Processing Ideas for Innovation: The Benefits 
of a Market-Facing Approach” 
SWP 28/93 Joe Nellis 
“The Changing Structure and Role of Building 
Societies in the UK Financial Services Sector” 
SWP 29/93 Kevin Daniels, Gerry Johnson & Leslie de 
Chematony 
“Similarity or Understanding: Differences in 
the Cognitive Models of Buyers and Sellers. A 
Paper outlining Issues in Mapping and 
Homogeneity” 
SWP 30/93 Habte Selassie 62 Roy Hill 
“The Joint Venture Formation Environment in 
a Sub-Saharan African Country: A Case Study 
of Government Policy and Host Partner 
Capability” 
SWP 3 l/93 Colin Armistead, Graham Clark and Paula 
Stanley 
“Managing Service Recovery” 
SWP 32193 Mike Sweeney 
“The Strategic Management of International 
Manufacturing and Sourcing” 
SWP 33/93 Julia Newton 
“An Integrated Perspective on Strategic 
Change” 
SWP 34/93 Robert Brown 
“The Graduate Enterprise Programme: 
Attempting to Measure the Effectiveness of 
Small Rllsiness Tmininv” 
CRANFIELD WORKING PAPERS 
List No 8, 1994 
SWP l/94 Keith Goffin 
“Repertory Grids in Market Research: An 
Example 
SWP 2194 Mark Jenkins 
“A Methodology for Creating and Comparing 
Strategic Causal Maps” 
SWP 3194 Simon Knox 
“Re-engineering the Brand” 
SWP 4/94 Robert Brown 
Encouraging Rural Enterprise in Great Britain 
- Britain’s “Venturecash” Competition 
SWP 5194 Andy Bytheway, Bernard Dyer & Ashley 
Braganza 
“Beyond the Value Chain: A New Framework 
for Business Modelling” 
SWP 6/94 Joe Nellis 
“Challenges and Prospects for the European 
Financial Services Industry” 
SWP 7/94 Keith Thompson, Panagiotis Alekos & 
Nikolaos Haziris 
“Reasoned Action Theory applied to the 
Prediction of Olive Oil Usage” 
SWP 8194 Sanjoy Mukherjee & Ashley Braganza 
“Core Process Redesign in the Public Sector” 
SWP 9194 Mike Sweeney 
“A Methodology for the Strategic Management 
of International Manufacturing and Sourcing” 
SWP lo/94 Ariane Hegewisch & Henrik Holt Larsen 
“European Developments in Public Sector 
Human Resource Management” 
SWP 1 l/94 Valerie Bence 
“Telepoint: Lessons in High Technology 
Product Marketing” 
SWP 12194 Andy Bytheway 
‘Seeking Business Improvement: A Systematic 
Approach” 
SWP 13194 Chris Edwards & Ashley Braganza 
“Classifying and Planning BPR Initiatives: The 
BPR Web” 
SWP 14/94 Mark Jenkins & Malcolm McDonald 
“Defining and Segmenting Markets: 
Archetypes and Research Agendas” 
SWP 15/94 Chris Edwards & Joe Peppard 
“Forging a Link between Business Strategy and 
Business Re-engineering” 
SWP 16/94 Andrew Myers, Andrew Kakabadse, Colin 
Gordon & Siobhan Alderson 
“Effectiveness of French Management: 
Analysis of the Behaviour, Attitudes and 
Business Impact of Top Managers” 
SWP 17/94 Malcolm Harper 
Micro-Credit - The Benign Paradox 
CRANFIELD WORKING PAPERS 
List No 9,1995 
SWP l/95 Andy Bytheway 
“Information in the Supply Chain: Measuring 
Supply Chain Performance” 
SWP 3/95 Kevin Daniels, Gerry Johnson, & Leslie de 
Chematony 
“Collective Frames of Reference, Recognition, 
and Managers’ Mental Models of Competition: 
A Test of Two Industries” 
SWP 4/95 Alison Rieple 
“Staffing as a Lever of Strategic Change - The 
Influence of Managerial Experience, Behaviour 
and Values” 
SWP 5195 Grafton Whyte & Andy Bytheway 
“Factors Affecting Information Systems 
Success” 
SWP 6/95 Andy Bailey & Gerry Johnson 
“The Processes of Strategy Development” 
SWP 7195 Valerie Bence 
“The Changing Market for Distribution: 
Implications for Exe1 Logistics” 
SWP 8195 Valerie Bence 
“The Evolution of a Distribution Brand: The 
Case of Exe1 Logistics” 
SWP 9195 Andy Bytheway 
“A Review of ED1 Research’ 
SWP 10195 Andy Bytheway 
“A Review of Current Logistics Practice” 
SWP 1 II95 Joe Peppard 
“Broadening Visions of BPR: The Imperative 
of Strategic Intearation” 
SWP 12195 Simon Knox & David Walker 
“Empirical Developments in the Measurement 
of Involvement, Brand Loyalty and their 
Structural Relationships in Grocery Markets” 
SWP 13195 Ashley Braganza & Andrew Myers 
“Issues and Dilemmas Facing Public and 
Private Sector Organisations in the Effective 
Implementation of BPR’ 
SWP 14195 John Mapes 
“Compatibility and Trade-Off Between 
Performance: An Alternative View” 
SWP 15195 Mike Sweeney & Marek Szwejczewski 
“Manufacturing Standards of Performance for 
Success” 
SWP 16195 Keith Thompson, Nicholas Thompson & 
Roy Hill 
“The Role of Attitudinal, Normative and 
Control Beliefs in Drink Choice Behaviour” 
SWP 17195 Andy Bytheway 
“Information Modelling for Management” 
SNP 18195 Mike Sweeney & Marek Szwejczewski 
“Manufacturing Strategy and Performance: A 
Study of the UK Engineering Industry” 
SWP 19195 Valerie Bence 
“StJames’s Hospital and Lucas Engineering 
Systems Ltd - A Public/Private Sector 
Collaboration in BPR Project A - Elective 
Admissions” 
SWP 20195 Valerie Bence 
“St. James’s Hospital and Lucas Engineering 
Systems Ltd - A Public/Private Sector 
Collaboration in BPR Project B - The Re- 
Organisation of Purchasing and Supplies” 
SWP 2 l/95 Simon Knox & David Walker 
“New Empirical Perspectives on Brand 
Loyalty: Implications for Segmentation 
Strategy and Equity” 
CRANFIELD WORKING PAPERS 
List No lo,1996 
SWP l/96 Andy Bailey & Gerry Johnson 
“Patterns of Strategy Development” 
SWP 2196 Simon Knox & David Walker 
“Understanding Consumer Decision Making in 
Grocery Markets: New Evidence from the 
Fishbein Model” 
SWP 3196 Kim James, Michael Jarrett & Donna Lucas 
“Psychological Dynamics and Organisational 
Learning: from the Dysfunctional Organisation 
to the Healthy Organisation” 
SWP 4196 Mike Sweeney & Marek Szwejczewski 
“The Search for Generic Manufacturing 
Strategies in the UK Engineering Industry” 
SWP 5196 John Baker 
“Agility and Flexibility: What’s the 
Difference” 
SWP 6196 Stephen Adamson, Noeleen Doherty & Claire 
Viney 
“30 Years On - What Have We Learned About 
Careers?” 
SWP 7196 Keith GoBin, Marek Szwejczewski & Colin 
New 
“Supplier Base Management: An Empirical 
Investigation” 
SWP 8196 Keith Goffin 
“Operations Management Teaching on 
European MBA Programmes” 
SWP 9196 Janet Price, Ashley Braganza & Oscar Weiss 
“The Change Initiative Diamond: A 
Framework to Balance Business Process 
Redesign with other Change Initiatives” 
CRANFIELD WORKING PAPERS 
List No 11,1997 
SWP II97 Helen Peck 
“Towards A Framework of Relationship 
Marketing: A Research Methodology” 
SWP 2197 Helen Peck 
“Towards A Framework of Relationship 
Marketing: An Initial Case Study” 
SWP 3197 Chris Edwards & Joe Peppard 
“A Critical Issue in Business Process Re- 
Engineering: Focusing the Initiative” 
SWP 4197 Joe Peppard and Don Fitzgerald 
“The Transfer of Culturally-Grounded 
Management Techniques: The Case of 
Business Re-Engineering in Germany” 
SWP 5197 Claire Viney & Shaun Tyson 
“Aligning HRM with Service Delivery” 
SWP 6197 Andy Bailey & Gerry Johnson 
“Logical or Processual? Defining 
Incrementalism” 
SWP 7197 Keith Got% 
“Evaluating Customer Support Requirements 
at the Product Design Stage” 
SWP 8197 Keith Goffin, Colin New & Marek 
Szwejczewski 
“How Innovative are UK Manufacturing 
Companies?’ 
SWP 9197 Kim James 
“Beyond Individual Stress Management 
Programmes: Towards an Organisational 
System Approach” 
SWP 10197 Mark Hambly & Richard Reeves 
“The Application of Foresight in UK Research 
and Development” 
SWP 1 l/97 Leslie Falkingham & Richard Reeves 
“Context Analysis - A Technique For 
Analysing Research in a Field, Applied to 
Literature on The Management of R&D at the 
Section Level” 
SWP 12197 Ali Jawad & Richard Reeves 
“Successful Acquisition of IT Systems” 
SWP 13197 Richard Reeves 
“Managing Research and Development” 
SWP 14197 Leslie Falkingham & Richard Reeves 
“The Four Schools of Thought in Research and 
Development Management and the 
Relationship of the Literature to Practitioners’ 
Needs” 
SWP 15197 Val Singh 
“A Qualitative Study of the Relationship 
between Gender and Managerial Perceptions of 
Engineers’ Commitment: Cases from the UK 
and Sweden” 
SWP 16197 John Fielding 
“Dividend Yields, Business Optimism and the 
Predictability of Long Horizon Returns in the 
UK” 
SWP 17197 Brenda Porter 
“Audit Committees in Private and Public 
Sector Corporates in New Zealand: An 
Empirical Investigation” 
SWP 18197 Brenda Porter 
“Securing Quality Audit(or)s: Attempts at 
Finding a Solution in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand” 
